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RÉSUMÉ 
 
 Contrairement à une certaine idée reçue, nous montrons que l'ouverture du 
marché domestique par l'abolition d'un tarif douanier ne va pas nécessairement rendre 
moins profitable les fusions domestiques. Cette idée suppose implicitement que le tarif 
en question est prohibitif avant son abolition et qu'il le demeure après une fusion. Or ce 
n'est souvent pas le cas. Nous montrons, à l'aide d'un exemple, que l'abolition du tarif 
pourrait, dans certains cas, rendre la fusion domestique plus profitable. 
 
Mots clés : fusions, lois sur la concurrence, libéralisation du commerce 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening up the domestic market to 
foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic 
mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent 
foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, 
so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. 
Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it 
nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. In this 
paper, we show, using a simple example, that in the latter two cases, abolishing the 
tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence, trade liberalization 
will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers. 
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1 Introduction
It is often thought that tarifi reduction should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discour-
aging domestic mergers. The reasoning is that the abolition of a tarifi on imports would
encourage foreign flrms to enter, thereby increasing the number of flrms serving the domes-
tic market. Since the merger of a subset of flrms in an oligopolistic Cournot equilibrium is
profltable only if the number of flrms in the subset is su–ciently large relative to the num-
ber flrms in the industry (see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983, and Gaudet and Salant,
1991), increasing the number of flrms in the domestic market will make it less likely that the
merger is profltable and, presumably, less likely that it would occur.1
The above argumentation implicitly rests on the assumption that the tarifi in question is
su–ciently high to prevent foreign flrms from selling in the domestic market. However, not
all tarifis are prohibitive. Hence foreign flrms may be present in the domestic market before
it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tarifi is prohibitive, a merger of domestics flrms may
render it non prohibitive, thus inviting foreign flrms to penetrate the domestic market. We
show in this paper, using a simple linear demand and zero marginal cost example, that in the
later two cases, abolishing the tarifi may in fact make the domestic merger more profltable.
A number of authors have in the past studied various normative or positive issues related
to mergers in a multi-country context. Some have looked at the welfare efiects of interna-
tional (i.e., cross-border) mergers or its comparison with the efiect of national mergers (for
instance Barros and Cabral 1994, Falvey, 1998, Kabiraj and Chaudhuri, 1999), while others
have stressed the interaction of competition policy and optimal trade policy in the context
of oligopolistic competition (for instance Collie, 2000 and Horn and Levinsohn, 1997). This
paper is more closely related to those that consider explicitly the efiect of tarifi reductions
on potential merger behavior of the flrms. This is the case in Ross (1988), Falvey (1998) and
Long and Vousden (1995). Ross analyzed the efiect of a tarifi reduction on the anticompeti-
1For an analysis of the endogenous decision to merge, see Kamien and Zang, 1991, and Gaudet and
Salant, 1992.
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tive consequences, or price raising properties, of a reduction in the number of flrms through
merger. He models both a domestic dominant oligopoly and an international oligopoly and
flnds that in some cases a lower tarifi serves to restrain price increases subsequent to a merger
and in other cases it does not. In particular, he concludes that in an international oligopoly
context, a unilateral tarifi reduction should tend to discourage mergers between domestic
flrms and encourage them between foreign flrms serving the domestic market. Falvey (1998)
discusses various implications of trade liberalisation for the profltability of mergers. One of
his flndings is that trade liberalisation is likely to generate merger activity between flrms in
the previously protected market. Long and Vousden (1995) also arrive at the conclusion that
a unilateral tarifi reduction will tend to increase the incentive to merge between domestic
flrms, but show that the efiect on the gain from merging depends on the size of the savings
in marginal costs which results from the merger2.
Each of those last three papers has looked at the efiects of a marginal variation in the
tarifi and hence cannot completely answer the problem addressed here. The question we pose
requires that we consider the efiect of a non marginal change in the tarifi, i.e., its abolition.
This involves comparing the equilibria that occur before and after the abolition of the tarifi.
A by-product of our analysis is that it may also serve to illustrate the fact that the efiect
of the marginal variation in the tarifi is likely to depend on the level of the tarifi at which
these variations are evaluated.
In section 2, we brie°y describe the model and its equilibrium. In section 3, we compare
the profltability of a merger in equilibrium with and without the tarifi, for difierent levels of
the tarifi. Brief concluding remarks follow in section 4.
2It is interesting to note their flnding that if the savings in marginal costs involved is small, or zero as in
the example considered here, then the gains from merging are negative. This is an illustration of the well
known result of Salant Switzer and Reynolds (1983). Of course if the gains from merging are negative, then
logically a marginal change in the tarifi should have no efiect on the incentive to merge.
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2 The model
Let Pd and Pf denote the market price on the domestic and on the foreign (rest of the
world) markets respectively and let Qd and Qf denote the corresponding aggregate quantities
on each market. The linear inverse demand functions will be denoted Pd = fl ¡ Qd and
Pf = b ¡Qf . We will assume that three flrms produce the homogeneous good: one foreign
flrm (flrm 0) and two domestic flrms (flrms 1 and 2). This means that Qj =
P
i q
j
i , i = 0; 1; 2,
j = d; f , where qdi and q
f
i denote the sales of flrm i, i = 1; 2, in the domestic and foreign
markets respectively. For simplicity, we assume that there are no variable costs of production
and no transport costs. The per unit tarifi imposed on the exports of the foreign flrm to the
domestic market will be denoted t (t ‚ 0).
The proflts of the flrms are then
…0 =
‡
b¡Qf
·
qf0 +
‡
fl ¡Qd
·
qd0 ¡ tqd0 (1)
…1 =
‡
fl ¡Qd
·
qd1 +
‡
b¡Qf
·
qf1 (2)
…2 =
‡
fl ¡Qd
·
qd2 +
‡
b¡Qf
·
qf2 : (3)
and the unique Cournot equilibrium is given by
qf0 = q
f
1 = q
f
2 = q
f =
b
4
; Qf =
3b
4
(4)
and
qd1 = q
d
2 = q
d =
fl + t
4
; qd0 =
fl ¡ 3t
4
; Qd =
3fl ¡ t
4
: (5)
We will assume interior solutions for all quantities except possibly qd0 , which may be zero if
t is prohibitively high. This will be the case if t ‚ fl
3
. Otherwise, if 0 • t < fl
3
, all three flrms
sell on both markets.
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If the tarifi is prohibitive, the equilibrium proflts are
…1 = …2 = …
d =
fl2
9
+
b2
16
; …0 =
b2
16
: (6)
Otherwise, with all three flrms present on both markets, they are
…1 = …2 = …
d =
(fl + t)2
16
+
b2
16
; …0 =
(fl + t) (fl ¡ 3t)
16
+
fl
16
: (7)
Suppose now that the two domestic flrms merge and let qdm and q
f
m denote the sales of the
merged flrm in the domestic and foreign markets respectively. The equilibrium quantities
are then given by
qfm = q
f
0 =
b
3
; Qf =
2b
3
(8)
and
qdm =
fl + t
3
; qd0 =
fl ¡ 2t
3
; Qd =
2fl ¡ t
3
: (9)
After the merger, the tarifi therefore becomes prohibitive whenever t ‚ fl
2
. Otherwise, if
0 • t < fl
2
, the two flrms are present on each market.
Whenever the tarifi is prohibitive, the equilibrium proflts will now be
…m =
fl2
4
+
b2
9
; …0 =
b2
9
; (10)
whereas if both flrms are present on each market, they are
…m =
(fl + t)2
9
+
b2
9
; …0 =
(fl + t) (fl ¡ 2t)
9
+
b2
9
: (11)
We have so far assumed that there are no flxed costs. It is well known from Salant, Switzer
and Reynolds (1983), and it can be easily verifled from the above, that in the absence of
flxed costs, the merger just described is not profltable. However, it will become profltable
if su–cient flxed cost is avoided by merging. Assume then that each flrm faces an identical
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flxed cost of F > 0 and, following Gaudet and Salant (1992), let µ denote the threshold level
of this flxed cost which would make the merger just profltable. The value of µ is given by
…m ¡ µ = 2 (…d ¡ µ) : (12)
By the deflnition of µ, the merger will be strictly profltable if and only F > µ. In this sense,
any intervention that increases µ renders the merger less profltable. In the case at hand, the
value of µ will depend on t.
The preceeding analysis suggests that it is useful to distinguish four cases, along with
the corresponding values for the threshold level of flxed cost:
Case 1 t = 0, in which case the threshold level is µ1 =
fl2
72
+ b
2
72
,
Case 2 0 < t < fl
3
, in which case the threshold level is µ2 =
(fl+t)2
72
+ b
2
72
,
Case 3 fl
3
• t < fl
2
, in which case the threshold level is µ3 =
2fl2¡(fl+t)2
9
+ b
2
72
,
Case 4 fl
2
• t, in which case the threshold level is µ4 = ¡fl236 + b
2
72
.
Case 1 represents the free trade reference case. In Case 2, the tarifi is positive, but not
su–ciently so to be prohibitive. In Case 3, the tarifi is prohibitive before the merger, but
not after the merger. In Case 4, the tarifi is prohibitive both before and after the merger.
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts, µ, the threshold level of flxed cost as a function
of the tarifi. The flgure is drawn with values of the parameters set at fl = b = 1 for illustrative
purposes3. Notice that µ4 is always smaller than µ1, independent of the values of fl and b,
but it is not necessarily negative | it will be positive if the slope of the demand curve in
the foreign market (b) is su–ciently larger than that in the domestic market (fl).
3The strict convexity of the segment µ2 and the strict concavity of the segment µ3 is only slightly apparent
on the graph because of scale efiects, but it is real.
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Figure 1: Fixed Costs Profitability Threshold as a Function of the Tariff
θ
0 3/β 2/β t
4θ
3θ
2θ
1θ
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3 The efiect of removing the tarifi
The question we now want to ask is whether abolishing the tarifi will render the merger more
or less profltable. We do this by comparing the threshold levels for each of Cases 2, 3 and 4
to that in Case 1. If, for some i = 2; 3; 4, µi > (<)µ1, then, in that case, the merger has to
save a larger (smaller) amount of flxed costs than under free trade in order to be profltable,
which means that abolishing the tarifi makes the merger more (less) profltable.
3.1 The tarifi is not prohibitive
When the tarifi is not prohibitive to begin with (Case 2), we verify that
µ1 ¡ µ2 = fl
2 ¡ (fl + t)2
72
< 0:
This means that the cost saving required for the merger to be just profltable in the presence
of the tarifi is greater than under free trade: paradoxically, trade liberalization increases
the profltablity of the merger. The reason why this can occur is quite simple. Although
abolishing the tarifi reduces the joint proflts (gross of flxed cost) of the domestic flrms
whether they are merged or not, it reduces it less if the two flrms are merged than if they
are not.
Notice that it is perfectly possible for an unprofltable merger to become profltable after
trade liberalization. This is the case when µ1 < F < µ2.
3.2 The tarifi is not prohibitive only if the flrms are merged
In Case 3, the tarifi is prohibitive when the domestic flrms are not merged, but not otherwise.
The reason is that, given the tarifi, turning a monopoly on the domestic market into an
asymmetric duopoly is attractive to the foreign flrm, but turning a symmetric duopoly into
an asymmetric triopoly is not.
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In this case, the difierence in the threshold levels of flxed costs is given by
µ1 ¡ µ3 = fl
2
72
¡ 2fl
2 ¡ (fl + t)2
9
;
and we verify that4
µ1 ¡ µ3 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>:
< 0 if
fl
3
• t < fl
ˆp
30
4
¡ 1
!
= 0 if t = fl
ˆp
30
4
¡ 1
!
> 0 if fl
ˆp
30
4
¡ 1
!
< t <
fl
2
Therefore the merger may be more profltable under free trade in this case as well, provided
the tarifi is not too high. This will occur if fl=3 < t < fl
‡p
30=4¡ 1
·
. However, for a
su–ciently high tarifi (fl
‡p
30=4¡ 1
·
< t < fl=2), abolishing it will make the merger less
profltable. This is because, for t < (>) fl
‡p
30=4¡ 1
·
, the loss in joint proflts to the
domestic flrms which results from abolishing the tarifi is greater (smaller) if they are not
merged than if they are, and is exactly equal if t = fl
‡p
30=4¡ 1
·
.
3.3 The tarifi is prohibitive whether the flrms are merged or not
Finally, the tarifi may be so high that it is prohibitive whether the domestic flrms are merged
or not. This is Case 4, for which
µ1 ¡ µ4 = fl
2
24
> 0:
In this case, trade liberalization always reduces the profltability of the domestic merger.
In fact, if µ4 is negative, then the merger is profltable even in the absence of flxed costs,
something which is not possible when there is no tarifi, as µ1 is always positive.
5 This occurs
4There is a second root to µ1 ¡ µ3 = 0, which we neglect, since it is negative.
5The fact that µ1 is positive is a simple illustration of the result of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983)
that, in a Cournot equilibrium with linear demand, linear costs and no flxed costs, a merger which includes
8
when fl2 > b2=2, which means that the domestic market is su–ciently more important than
the foreign market.
4 Concluding remarks
Some of the quantitative results obtained clearly depend on the simplifying assumptions of
linearity and on the fact that the number of domestic flrms is twice the number of foreign
flrms. Those simplifying assumptions were made only to facilitate the demonstration that
the argument that trade liberalization reduces the profltability of domestics mergers is not a
clear cut one: it depends on the level of the tarifi that is being abolished. The demonstration
can easily be extended to more general assumptions on the demand and costs functions and
on the number of flrms.
less than eighty percent of the flrms is not profltable.
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